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Emergency Rhetoric in the US Congress: 
Debating the National Emergencies Act of 1976
Anna Kronlund1
AbstrAct
From the Constitutional Convention onwards the question of emergency 
powers has been central to political discussions in the United States. The 
debates on the National Emergencies Act of 1976 (“NEA”) can be seen, how-
ever, as specifically relevant to the conception of the state of emergency in 
US constitutional politics. The law placed the process of declaring, executing, 
and terminating a state of emergency on a statutory footing and established 
new procedures for dealing with further emergencies. The paper examines, 
through the debates, the question of to what extent president’s war/emergency 
powers are contingent on Congress exploiting its own constitutional powers. 
The problematic of dealing with emergency powers through the framework of 
a statutory delegation of power is also addressed.
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Extensive debates concerning the presidential use of emergency and war 
powers arose in the United States after the Vietnam War. According to Senator 
Church (D-ID), an incident during the course of the hearing on the involve-
ment of US forces to Cambodia organized by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in 19722 “brought the scope of emergency powers and their poten-
tial undermining constitutional government to the attention of the Congress.” 
(Discussion on the National Emergencies Act, Congressional Record (CR) 
1976, S33416). In this paper I examine the question of how the president’s 
war/emergency powers are contingent on Congress exploiting its own consti-
1 University of Jyväskylä. E-mail: anna.kronlund@jyu.fi. This paper is part of the project 
The Politics of Dissensus (Academy of Finland).
2 Foreign Assistance Act of 1973: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on 
appropriations, 92nd Congress, 2nd session (See Fuller 1979, 1454).
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tutional powers in the NEA debates, as well as the problems concerning the 
statutory delegations of power.
A Senate Special Committee was formed in early 1970s to study exist-
ing emergencies and the use of emergency powers in the United States. The 
Committee’s concluding result was the National Emergencies Act. The bill 
(S.3957) was introduced by the Senate Special Committee on August 2, 1974. 
The Senate Committee on Government Operations reported the bill on Sep-
tember 30, 1974 and it passed in Senate in October 1974. The bill was fur-
ther referred to the House Committee on Judiciary, which, however, failed 
to take any further action. Since the House Committee and its chairman Pete 
Rodino (D-NJ) were engaged with the Watergate hearings, consideration of 
the measure was not completed before the expiration of the 93rd Congress. 
Senator Mathias (R-MD) together with Senator Church (D-ID) introduced a 
similar bill S.977 in March 1975. At the same time Representative Rodino 
introduced H.R.3884, a bill identical to S. 977, for the House. The H.R.3884 
bill was referred to House Judiciary Committee and passed the House with 
some amendments on September 4, 1975 by a vote of 388-5. The National 
Emergencies Act was finally enacted in August 1976 with President Gerald 
Ford’s signature (Klieman 1979, 64; NEA Source Book 1976).
The purpose of the national emergency legislation was to terminate al-
ready existing emergencies. Further, the bill’s intention in establishing the 
authority for emergency declarations was to clearly define the powers of the 
president and secure regular congressional oversight and accountability for 
actions taken by the executive. The Senate Committee print explained the 
need for the new kind of legislation: “The aim of the National Emergencies 
Act is to insure that the exercise of national emergency authority is responsi-
ble, appropriate and timely” (NEA Source Book 1976, 1).
The NEA legislation was enacted without that much public or scholarly no-
tice. Klieman (1979, 47) writes that the bill came “at the height of a presidential 
election year and amidst the special bicentennial celebration”. Even later on the 
bill has not attracted much attention compared to the War Powers Resolution, 
which was enacted three years earlier (Klieman 1979, 48). Senator Church ar-
gues, however, that Congress considered the Act highly important:
Emergency powers make up a relatively small but important body 
of statutes out of the total of thousands that have been passed or 
recodified since 1933. But emergency powers laws are of such im-
portance to civil liberties, to the operation of domestic and foreign 
commerce, and the normal functioning of the US government, that 
Congress should delay no longer in regularizing their use (Intro-
duction of S.3957 CR 1974, S15784).
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In retrospect, it seems that the law has not succeeded in providing any 
affirmative framework for the exercise of emergency powers. After Septem-
ber 11, 2001, the conceptions of national emergencies and emergency pow-
ers have been at the very centre of political discussions. The Congress has 
been reluctant to insist on co-operation between the legislative and executive 
branches of government similar to that of the 1970s. This seems to suggest 
that the NEA bill has not succeeded in defining the exercise of emergency 
powers in a way that would secure regular congressional oversight and ac-
countability. One of the reasons is the vague wording of the bill and the lack 
of tools to create a specific framework for the use of emergency powers.
Forty yeArs oF emergency government in the United stAtes
The need to specify the use of presidential emergency powers emerged in 
the 1970s, by which time the United States had been formally under a national 
emergency government since 1930s. The Senate Special Committee found that 
the emergencies proclaimed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to deal with the 
banking crisis in 1933, by Harry S. Truman to respond to the Korean conflict 
in 1950, by Richard M. Nixon to cope with the Post Office strike in 1970, and 
by Nixon again to enforce currency constraints and to execute regulations on 
foreign trade in 1971 had never been terminated. Further, the Senate Special 
Committee found that there were over 470 emergency power statutes granting 
extra ordinary powers to the president (NEA Source Book, 1976). Congress had 
delegated the powers without fully taking into account their cumulative effect 
over time. For instance, Senator Church noted during the Senate discussions of 
the bill that apparently no consideration had been given to their combined effect 
on the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches or 
on civil liberties (A National Emergencies Act CR 1974, S29976).
The real problem also was that these kinds of emergency legislations have 
been enacted without securing enough time for debate and thoughtful consid-
eration. According to Senator Church “inadequate and hurried way of legislat-
ing” had been done repeatedly, e.g. during the Second World War and Korean 
War, and in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964. Senator Church commented 
in the course of the National Emergencies Act discussions,
On occasions, legislative history shows that during the limited de-
bates that did take place, a few but very few, objections were raised 
by Senators and Congressmen expressing concern about the lack of 
provision for congressional oversight, as well as the absence of any 
terminal date for authorities granted (A National Emergencies Act 
CR 1974, S29976).
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The Senate Special Committee Report (S.Rept. 94-922) from March 1973 
concluded that Congress had allowed the executive branch to draft laws. Most 
of the emergency statutes were written by the executive branch and sent to 
Congress in a crisis atmosphere without providing any requirements for con-
gressional oversight or specific dates for termination. Senator Church argued 
on the floor of the Senate that this had happened “despite the constitutional 
responsibility conferred on Congress by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion, which states that Congress ‘makes the laws’” (A National Emergencies 
Act CR 1974, S29976).
Several members of Congress gave examples of Congress’ failure to fulfil 
its constitutional duties during the discussions concerning the bill: “It is im-
portant to understand how the present state of emergency rule has come about. 
The failure to place emergency rule under firm constitutional guidelines must 
be considered as a failure by all three branches to carry out their respective 
constitutional responsibilities,” said Senator Mathias (Debate and adoption 
of S.3957, 1974, quoted in the NEA Source Book 1976, 151). Representative 
Hutchinson (R-MI) also pointed out that the legislation was crucially needed 
because there were no rules or regulations concerning the use of emergency 
powers:
The “National Emergencies Act” is an appropriate and prudent re-
sponse to an important policy question currently facing Congress, 
that is how extensive should be the powers granted to the Presi-
dent in a time of national emergency and, further, how should the 
exercise of these special powers be overseen and controlled? […] 
This measure seeks to remedy the fact that no statutory framework 
now exists to guide the conduct of our government during a period 
of national emergency (House debate and adoption of H.R.3884, 
1975, quoted in the NEA Source Book 1976, 252).
The arguments expressed during the discussions of the NEA legislation 
illustrate that the Congress namely wanted to restore the constitutional checks 
and balances requirement to the field of war and emergency powers. Sev-
eral members emphasised that national emergency powers presuppose the 
cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of government: 
“This bill represents another effort by Congress to insure that Congress and 
the President share equally the responsibility for major national policy deci-
sions.” (Senator Roth (R-DE), Debate and adoption of S.3957, 1974, quoted 
in the NEA Source Book 1976, 170) Members emphasised, however, that 
Congress did not intend to infringe upon the constitutional powers of the 
president, as Representative Hutchinson argued:
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As a firm believer in a strong presidency and Executive flexibility, 
I could not support this bill if it would impair any of the rightful 
constitutional powers of the President. It will have no impact on his 
flexibility to declare a national emergency and to quickly respond 
if the necessity arises. The bill has no impact on the powers of the 
President in time of war. Rather, what it seeks to assure is that the 
rule of law prevails in a national emergency situation and that it 
cannot be bypassed, merely because we find ourselves in a state 
of national emergency (House debate and adoption of H.R.3884, 
1975, quoted in the NEA Source Book 1976, 252-3).
Despite the understandable concentration of power (mainly executive) 
in times of crisis, the principle of separation of powers should prevent emer-
gency powers from being used to attempt to acquire absolute or unilateral 
power. Senator Church, expressed this idea in the Congress with the following 
words:
The Congress should be forewarned that it is inherent in the nature 
of government that the executive will seek to enlarge its power. We 
already have a Presidency the powers of which are unrivaled in our 
history. The historic redemption of jurisdiction by the Congress 
which has gone in this decade - in the form of the War Powers Act, 
the congressional intervention to circumscribe and finally to end 
the war in Vietnam, the new budget authority and the regaining of 
some control over foreign policy – is long overdue and urgently 
needed. The Congress must not again trade away its responsibili-
ties in the name of national emergency (Senate debate and adoption 
of H.R.3884, 1976, quoted in the NEA Source Book 1976, 338).
The main arguments behind the legislation specified the future availability 
of emergency powers. Another question of concern to the members was: How 
it is possible to define the powers of the president within a statutory frame-
work and to secure the participation of Congress in times of crisis?
deFining the scope oF nAtionAl emergencies throUgh the stAtUtory 
FrAmeworK
Despite certain historical-legal paradigms for national emergency situ-
ations, the conception of emergency has remained vague and problematic. 
Foreign policy staff member of the Senate Thomas A. Dine argued during the 
committee hearings of the NEA in 1973: “In my discussions and research, I 
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have yet to come across definition. There is no objective or standard defini-
tion [of national emergency] […] If the President says so, it is a national 
emergency” (Committee Print 96-780, quoted in the Senate hearings before 
the Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, Part 1, 
1973, 258). Senator Pell (D-RI) further acknowledged during the executive 
session:
I wonder if there are really three gradations of emergency - nation-
al economic emergency, national military emergency, and national 
survival emergency. The President has the constitutional duty in a 
survival situation to do everything he can to save the United States 
(ibid., 259).
The concept of “emergency” is not defined in the Constitution. Scholars 
are divided as to whether the Founding Fathers left emergency powers out of 
the Constitution intentionally, or whether they intended the system of checks 
and balances to apply also to war and emergency powers. For instance, the 
Congress can declare war but the President is Commander-in-Chief.
The National Emergencies Act of 1976 also failed to specify the con-
cept of a state of emergency. The earlier versions of the bill included a sec-
tion (201 a) that provided a more specific framework to national emergency 
proclamations: “In the event the President finds that the proclamation of a 
national emergency is essential to the preservation, protection, and defense of 
the Constitution, and is essential to the common defense, safety, or well-being 
of the territory and people of the United States, the President is authorized to 
proclaim the existence of a national emergency” (NEA Source Book 1976, 
25). The final version failed to describe what kind of emergencies the bill 
was intended to cover. Without such a specification the courts and Congress 
face the difficult of how to hold up any standard to justify the use of emer-
gency powers. The final version of the bill states, “with respect to Acts of 
Congress authorizing the exercise, during a period of a national emergency, 
of any special or extraordinary power, the President is authorized to declare 
such a national emergency. Any such proclamation must be transmitted to the 
Congress and published in the Federal Register.” The bill continues, “When 
the President declares a national emergency, no powers or authorities made 
available by statute for use in the event of an emergency shall be exercised 
unless and until the President specifies the provisions of law under which he 
proposes that he, or other officers will act” (Public Law 94-412).
Interestingly, the bill itself does not make any references to the Constitu-
tional habeas corpus clause, which generally is considered the only reference 
to any kind of emergency powers in the US Constitution. The Constitution of 
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the United States establishes: “The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the 
public safety may require it (US Constitution 1787, Article 1, section 9).” The 
debate and the final version of the legislation, however, illustrate that Con-
gress recognised the constitutional power of the president to declare national 
emergencies.
The idea to create constitutional emergency powers did not seriously 
occur in the congressional discussions surrounding the National Emergencies 
Act of 1976. Rather, the Congress generally approved of possible expansion 
of the chief executive’s power during times of crisis. The augmentation of 
presidential power should not, however, happen at the expense of congres-
sional authority. Representative Rodino argued in Congress,
The [national emergencies act] bill does not take any emergency 
powers away from the President. Rather, it insures that such pow-
ers are exercised only during an actual emergency and that both 
Congress and the public are kept informed of the exercise of such 
emergency powers (Bill to End Unterminated National Emergen-
cies 1974, quoted in the NEA Source Book 1976, 175).
The discussions clearly illustrate that there was a felt need to provide 
statutory delegation of power in order to make sure the constitutional separa-
tion of powers applies in times of crisis as well. Senator Church emphasized 
that there had been a steady erosion of the constitutional government:
Nonetheless, the emergency powers made available to the President 
have steadily expanded. Foreign war and domestic crisis during the 
past 40 years, in addition to the inexorable growth of the executive 
bureaucracy under the leadership of aggressive presidents, and the 
diminished role of the Congress in the making of policy – these 
factors have all contributed to the erosion of normal constitutional 
government (Senate debate and adoption of H.R.3884, 1976, quot-
ed in the NEA Source Book 1976, 337).
Therefore, Congress tried several times in the 1970s to restore the con-
stitutional balance between the executive and the legislative branches of the 
government by enacting new legislation, such as the War Powers Resolution 
in 1973 and the National Emergencies Act in 1976.
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the prActicAl problemAtic oF the neA bill
Most members of Congress responded positively to the legislation. How-
ever, critical comments were presented concerning mainly the lack of legis-
lation to specifically address restrictions on the use of emergency powers. 
Representive Holtzman (D-NY) stated on the floor: “When we delegate vast 
powers to the President, we ought to also take into account how to protect the 
people from an abuse of those powers. Unfortunately, this bill fails to do this 
effectively.” (House debate and adoption of H.R. 3884, 1975, quoted in the 
NEA Source Book 1976, 276) The final version of the bill did not include any 
specification of what would be considered an “abuse” of presidential emer-
gency powers. The president may declare a national emergency whenever 
deeming it necessary. Such use of national emergency powers by the president 
was not disputed, but rather the “possible and arbitrary use of emergency 
powers”. All members of Congress did not, however, take the president’s 
“unilateral emergency powers” without reservation:
It seems to be, Mr. Chairman, very clear that the Congress was 
given the lawmaking powers under the Constitution, and that what-
ever right the President has to declare an emergency should be 
spelled out by the Congress of the United States. Through the last 
40 years, the Congress has been very careless and derelict in not 
doing this. […] Why should we in the Congress allow the President 
unilaterally to proclaim an emergency and unilaterally to imple-
ment provisions of said emergency? That is an abdication of the 
power clearly placed in the Congress by the Constitution (Repre-
sentative Drinan (D-MA), House debate and adoption of H.R.3884, 
1975, quoted in the NEA Source Book 1976, 279).
Much discussion surrounding the National Emergencies Act of 1976 
concerned the fact that it gave Congress the burden to terminate unilateral 
presidential action instead of giving the president the burden of affirmatively 
demonstrating that an emergency really exists (House of Representatives de-
bate and adoption of H.R.3884, 1975, H8325-H8341). Representative Dri-
nan emphasised that emergencies should be short-term affairs, and Congress 
should not allow the president any “loose power” by which he or she could 
proclaim an emergency, since that could continue protractedly until both 
houses of the Congress agree to end it. Representative Drinan further pro-
posed an amendment to the bill in which he urged,
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[…] the Congress to adopt an amendment to this very necessary 
bill that would provide that the emergency proclaimed by the Presi-
dent automatically be terminated within 30 days unless Congress 
acts affirmatively to approve an extension (National Emergencies 
CR 1975, H27637).
Drinan refers to the burden of the Congress to terminate the presidential 
use of emergency powers. The final version of the bill established that no 
later than six months after a national emergency is declared and every six 
months after that, each house should consider a vote on a concurrent resolu-
tion concerning termination of the state of national emergency.3 This automat-
ic revocation requirement failed and become rather “a dead letter” in practice 
(Fisher 2007, 265). The original idea of the Senate Special Committee was 
that specific emergency powers could exist only for a set period of 30, 45, 
or 60 days. According to Representative Drinan (National Emergencies CR 
1975, H27642) the administration influenced the Senate Special Committee 
to change its view.
Due to the Supreme Court decision Ins. v. Chadha (1983), only joint reso-
lutions that are exposed to veto can nowadays be used to terminate declara-
tions of national emergency made by the president. The concurrent resolution, 
in the original language of the bill, is not subject to a presidential veto, but 
neither does it have the force of law. Therefore, concurrent resolutions are 
political rather than legal measures. Already in the 1970s there were doubts 
that the use of concurrent resolutions in the bills may be unconstitutional.4 
The concurrent resolution seemed to be, however, useful in that the presi-
dent could not interfere with congressional proposals to terminate a national 
emergency. If both houses must agree to the termination, the president may be 
rather easily able to prolong a national emergency, particularly in a situation 
where the president’s party controls the majority in one of the houses.
Distinguishing the normal from the exceptional was the main theme in the 
NEA discussions. By enacting NEA legislation Congress wanted to get rid of 
the vagueness of national emergencies, requiring, for instance, that the Presi-
dent not only proclaim when the national emergency exists, but also specify 
3 According to the National Emergencies Act of 1976: “Any national emergency declared 
by the President in accordance with this subchapter, and not otherwise previously terminated, 
shall terminate on the anniversary of the declaration of that emergency if, within the ninety-day 
period prior to each anniversary date, the President does not publish in the Federal Register and 
transmit to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such 
anniversary” (Public Law 94-412).
4 The Article I, section 7 of the US Constitution requires that “Every Order, Resolution, 
or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary 
(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States”.
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what actions the administration would pursue under the emergency procla-
mation. Following the example of Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in 
Youngstown v. Sawyer case (1952), Congress intention was to create statutory 
foundations for the use of emergency powers. In other words, when statutory 
guidelines exist, the President is obliged to follow them. (See more in detail 
NEA Source Book, 1976).
By creating a statutory framework, it might seem that the problematic of 
inherent or unilateral presidential emergency powers disappears. This, how-
ever, is not the case. Indeed, it was several times emphasised in the discus-
sions that Congress should not infringe on the constitutional powers of the 
president. The bill has not affected the way the emergency powers are legiti-
matised. The normal framework for enacting emergency powers in the United 
States has been Congress granting extraordinary (short-term) authorities for 
the president, which the president can invoke as deemed necessary. According 
to Justice Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown v. Sawyer by doing this “we retain 
Government by law – special, temporary law, perhaps, but law nonetheless” 
(Jackson, 1952). However, a problem with this kind of statutory framework 
seems to be that, on one hand, it does not remove the possibility of “extra-
legal use of emergency powers”, and on the other hand, the bills that Con-
gress enacts in times of crisis are often anything but short-term or temporary, 
becoming instead a permanent part of normal governmental activity. One 
could cite the Patriot Act for instance, which Congress enacted after 9/11. The 
bill contained some sunset provisions, because sections of it were considered 
legitimate only because of 9/11. Nevertheless, USA Patriot Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-177) made 14 sections of the 
bill, originally meant to expire, permanent in 2006.5
conclUding remArKs
Despite good intentions, the NEA bill has not succeeded in providing 
congressional oversight and accountability concerning the use of emergency 
powers. The law provided a normative framework but was not able to over-
come problems related to the actual content of the bill. One major problem 
is that the president alone is empowered to decide when, where and for what 
reason a national emergency exists. Another difficulty is that it puts the bur-
den on Congress to terminate the use of emergency powers. Currently the 
president can veto a termination request from Congress, which Congress can 
override only with a 2/3 majority. National emergencies continue to be long-
5 See more in detail CRS Report for Congress USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2005: A Legal Analysis. Brian T. Yeh & Charles Doyle, 2006: http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/intel/RL33332.pdf.
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term affairs. For instance, the national emergency proclaimed by President 
Bush after 9/11 is still valid, and was continued by President Obama once 
again in September 20126. Further, it seems that the NEA was unable to create 
specific framework to abolish the vagueness surrounding emergency powers 
discussions in the United States.
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